September 16, 2004, petitioner filed a state habeas petition in California Court of Appeal, which was denied on September 23, 2004. (Id.) On July 11, 2007, petitioner filed a state habeas petition in Contra Costa Superior Court, which was denied on August 23, 2007. (Id.) On September 11, 2007, petitioner filed a state habeas petition in California Court of Appeal, which was denied on September 13, 2007. (Id.) On October 9, 2007, petitioner filed a habeas petition in California Supreme Court, which was denied on March 26, 2008. (Id.) Petitioner filed the instant petition on July 25, 2008.

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Under AEDPA, prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must file petitions for relief within one year from the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).¹

Here, petitioner's conviction became final when the time to file a petition for review in California Supreme Court expired, or on September 6, 2004. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.264(b)(1), 8.500(c). Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), AEDPA's one-year limitation period began to run on that date, and expired one year later, on September 6, 2005. The instant petition was not filed until July 25, 2008, over two years later. Thus, absent tolling the instant petition is untimely.

The one-year statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the "time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." <u>Dictado v. Ducharme</u>, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). Here, petitioner's first state habeas petition,

¹ In rare instances the limitation period may run from a date later than the date on which the judgment became final. <u>See</u> 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except to the extent discussed below, there is no argument, or any apparent basis, for applying 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)(B)-(D) to the instant case.

filed on September 16, 2004 and denied on September 23, 2004, tolled the statute of limitations for seven days, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), extending the limitations period to September 13, 2005.

Petitioner did not file another state habeas petition until July 11, 2007, approximately one year nine months after the limitations period expired. A state habeas petition filed after AEDPA's statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitations period. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed," even if the state petition was timely filed). As petitioner's federal habeas petition was not filed until July 25, 2008, more than two years nine months after his limitations period expired, this action is untimely.

Petitioner does not argue, but the court nevertheless notes, that the commencement of the limitation period was not delayed in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Under that section, the commencement of the limitation period can be delayed until the date on which "the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Petitioner's only claim -- that the enhancement of his sentence by the judge violated his right to a jury trial -- relies upon a United States Supreme Court's decision, namely Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). However, because Cunningham did not establish a "new rule of constitutional law," Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 639 (9th Cir. 2008), but instead relied on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which was decided prior to the date petitioner's conviction became final, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply to this case.

As a result, the instant petition is not rendered timely by tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Further, although equitable tolling may be available in limited cases, there is no argument or indication that petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling in this case. As the instant petition was filed after the limitations period expired, the instant petition must be dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSION

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1	Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no. 10) is GRANTED.
2	The instant petition is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The clerk shall
3	terminate all pending motions and close the file.
4	IT IS SO ORDERED.
5	Dated: _3/16/09 Konald M. Whyte RONALD M. WHYTE
6	United States District Judge
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